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Abstract
We study three budget-neutral reforms of the German tax and transfer system designed to im-
prove work incentives for people with low incomes: a feasible flat tax reform that provides a
basic income which is equal to the current level of the means tested unemployment benefit, and
two alternative reforms that involve employment subsidies to stimulate participation and full-time
work, respectively. We estimate labor supply reactions and welfare effects using a microsimula-
tion model based on household data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and a structural labor
supply model. We find that all three reforms increase labor supply in the first decile of the in-
come distribution. However, the flat tax scenario reduces overall labor supply by 4.9%, the reform
scenario designed to increase participation reduces labor supply by 1%, while the reform that pro-
vides improved incentives to work full-time has negligible effects on overall labor supply. With
equal welfare weights, aggregate welfare gains are realizable under all three reforms.
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1 Introduction
Countries that provide transfers to the unemployed face the problem well known as the equity-
efficiency-trade-off in the public economics literature. For instance, in Germany transfers are
relatively generous (Franz et al. 2012), while withdrawal rates are very high and in some cases ex-
ceed 100%. This implies strong disincentives for people with low earning perspectives to work.
One frequently discussed way to improve these incentives is a flat tax scheme that implies lower
withdrawal rates compared to the status quo. For Germany, a flat tax proposed in Kirchhof (2003)
and in Kirchhof (2011) was part of the conservative election campaign in 2005. Such a flat tax is
often coupled with some kind of basic income (Friedman 2002, among others). This might off-
set or reverse the incentives to work due to necessary tax increases if it is granted unconditionally
and at a politically feasible level.1 The notion of basic income has become increasingly popular,
for example Atkinson (2005) argues that the introduction of an unconditional basic income would
eliminate the perverse disincentives brought about by social security benefits in combination with
high transfer withdrawal rates. In addition, Colombino (2009) points out that unconditional ba-
sic income could be advantageous from the perspective of redistribution and cost-effectiveness.2
We analyze how such a reform scenario fares compared to two alternative scenarios that aim to
improve work incentives for the poor. In contrast to other studies that investigate basic income
schemes, we study a financially feasible scenario that we calibrate to be budget-neutral. We use
the microsimulation model STSM for household data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and
estimate a structural labor supply model to calculate labor supply and welfare effects.
We contrast a flat tax/basic income reform (Flat Tax) to two alternative reform scenarios that
aim to improve incentives by directly subsidizing employment exceeding specific thresholds of
weekly working hours of people with low labor incomes—ten hours for the first reform (Employ-
ment) and 30 hours for the second reform (Full-Time). The first reform is financed by increas-
ing marginal tax rates and abolishing social security exemptions for marginal employment while
1In Germany, such a basic income would only be in accordance with the constitution if it was at least as high as
the subsistence level.
2Some examples how basic income works in practice are experiments from the US in New Jersey and Pennsylvania
from 1968 to 1972, in Iowa and North Carolina from 1969 to 1973, in Gary, Indiana, between 1971 and 1974, and
in Seattle and Denver from 1971 to 1982 (Munnell 1987), in the Canadian city Dauphin from 1974 to 1978 (Prescott
et al. 1986). A similar experiment providing a basic income of around 900 Euro per month is planned in Utrecht, set
to begin in January 2016. In the same year, Switzerland is slated to hold a referendum on implementing basic income.
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the second reform is financed only through the abolishment of social security exemptions and
increased marginal transfer withdrawal rates. The (Flat Tax) reform is a flat tax with marginal
transfer withdrawal rates equal to the marginal tax rate and an unconditional basic income equal to
the current subsistence level guaranteed through the means tested unemployment benefit (Unem-
ployment Benefit II) and social assistance.3
Several kinds of employment subsidies have been discussed in the literature and among prac-
titioners. Subsidies to social security contributions (SSC) for workers who work at least a specific
number of hours per week have been in place in Belgium (Bonus a l’emploi, an employment sub-
sidy for full-time workers with low labor income). A similar subsidy has recently been discussed
for Germany (see Bargain et al. 2010). Another form of hours conditions are tax credits for indi-
viduals who work at least a specific amount of hours per week, as in place in the United Kingdom.
Blundell and Shephard (2012) show that such an hours contingent payment may be optimal as a
full-time bonus, which is in line with our Full-Time scenario.4 In contrast to the social security
subsidies or tax credits analyzed in the aforementioned articles, we analyze direct employment
subsidies that are withdrawn only at relatively high levels of labor income. These are very similar
to the ones proposed by Keane (1995) who finds that for the United States such hours subsidies are
a cost-effective way of improving work incentives for lone parents living on low income. In the re-
forms Employment and Full-Time analyzed in our paper, people working more than the respective
hours threshold receive a net transfer of 1,560 Euro per year.
Our study adds to the literature on revenue neutral basic income systems for several European
countries (see, e.g., Colombino et al. 2010; Colombino and Narazani 2013). A closely related
study of a revenue neutral flat tax is conducted in Aaberge et al. (2000). For Germany, there are
several studies on basic income and flat-tax schemes scenarios (see, e.g. Colombo et al. 2008;
Fuest et al. 2008; Straubhaar 2008; Horstschra¨er et al. 2010), however, none of them considers a
tax and transfer schedule that is flat over the whole range of taxable income and does not include
a basic allowance. Moreover, most of the scenarios are not revenue neutral. Our study is the first
3Unemployment Benefit I is insurance based and available to short-term unemployed people (less than 12 to 24
month, depending on age), Unemployment Benefit II is means tested (income and wealth) and available to unemployed
people not entitled to Unemployment Benefit I, and social assistance refers to benefits for households that are not in
the labor force.
4A similar concept is the earned income tax credit (EITC) which is not conditional on working hours. See Hotz
and Scholz (2003) for a review and Immervoll et al. (2007) for a microsimulation analysis of reform scenarios similar
to the EITC.
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to analyze a flat tax for Germany that is revenue neutral.
We find that all three reforms increase labor supply in the first decile of the income distribution.
The flat tax scenario reduces overall labor supply by 4.9%, the Employment reform reduces labor
supply by 1%, while the Full-Time reform has a negligible effect on overall labor supply. With
equal welfare weights, aggregate welfare gains are realizable under all three reforms. The stronger
the redistributive taste, the higher are the welfare gains of the flat tax reform.
The next section presents the reform scenarios in detail and contrasts them to the current tax
and transfer system. Section 3 presents the budget constraints as well as participation tax rates
imposed by the reform scenarios. Section 4 describes our empirical approach, Section 5 presents
estimated labor supply and welfare effects and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Reform Scenarios
The German progressive income tax system is characterized by a basic allowance and two “pro-
gressive zones” with increasing marginal tax rates and a constant marginal tax rate in the two “lin-
ear zones”. For married couple households joint filing is the rule5, and the interaction with means
tested social transfers complicates the tax-benefit system greatly. Social security receipts derived
from previous contributions to the public pension, unemployment and health insurance funds are
not directly taxed but may affect the marginal tax rate. The means tested Unemployment Benefit II
provides the subsistence level for people unable to work and children. The subsistence level differs
by region due to different costs of living, but a typical single household receives about 800 Euro
per month of Unemployment Benefit II (Appendix for §28 Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) XII and hous-
ing costs). Social Assistance or Unemployment Benefit II for the first child in a household is 380
Euro per month (ibid).6 For couple households and families with children the subsistence level for
each member is adjusted relative to the one of the household head and differs by the number and
age of children living in the household. The main components of the current system (Status Quo
2015)7 and their changes under the alternative reform scenarios are summarized in Table 1.
5Married couples may choose to be taxed jointly and make use of income splitting. This implies that the income
tax of a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function to half of the sum of taxable incomes of the spouses,
and the resulting amount is then doubled to determine the tax liability of the couple.
6More precisely, the standard rates are 364, 328, 287, 251, 215 Euro for singles, partners, each child of age 15 to
18, 7 to 14, 0 to 6, respectively. Moreover, appropriate costs of lodging and heating are covered.
7For the simulations we use parameters and data of the most recent year implemented in the STSM (2011).
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Table 1: Current System and Changes under Alternative Reform Scenarios.
Status Quo (2015) Employment Full-Time Flat Tax
Marginal Tax Rates (MTRs)
Basic allowance of 8,354 Euro No Change No Change –
1st progressive zone: increasing MTR from 0.14 increasing MTR from 0.21 No Change –
2nd progressive zone: increasing MTR from 0.24 increasing MTR from 0.245 No Change –
from 13,470 Euro from 13,470 Euro
1st linear zone: MTR of 0.42 from 52,882 Euro No Change No Change MTR of 0.6885
2nd linear zone: MTR of 0.45 from 250,731 Euro No Change No Change –
Transfers and Marginal Withdrawal Rates (MWRs)
about 800 Euro/month for first adult No Change No Change Basic income of 800 Euro/month
380 Euro/month for first child No Change No Change 380 Euro/month for children
Allowance of 100 Euro/month – – –
MWR of 0.8 up to monthly income of 1,000 Euro MWR of 0.6 up to income of 1,200 Euro MWR of 0.6885
(1,500 Euro with children in household)
MWR of 0.9 up to monthly income of 1,200 Euro
(1,500 Euro with children in household) (All other transfers
MWR of 1 afterwards MWR of 1 afterwards MWR of 1 for people under 65
are abolished)
Employment Subsidy
– Subsidy of 1,560 Euro/year Subsidy of 1,560 Euro/year –
for people working at least 10 h/week for people working at least 30 h/week
Withdrawn at rate of 0.19 Withdrawn at rate of 0.19
from 28,250 Euro/year from 27,150 Euro/year
Social Security Contributions (SSC) and Mini-Jobs
Mini Jobs (up to 450 Euro/month) Mini and Midi Job rules abolished Mini and Midi Job rules abolished Mini and Midi Jobs abolished
are exempted from income tax and SSC SSC are contained in flat tax
Midi Jobs (up to 850 Euro/month)
Marginal SSC of 0.27
Afterwards marginal SSC of 0.19
Notes: SSC include unemployment insurance, old age insurance, health insurance and long term care insurance. Marginal SSC are up to specific income levels for different
SSC components. For all reform scenarios the employer’s contribution remains unchanged.
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The Employment scenario stipulates increases in marginal tax rates by raising the starting
marginal tax rate of the progressive zones. The Full-Time reform scenario does not involve changes
in the tax schedule. To increase incentives to take up work, the Employment and Full-Time reform
scenarios involve tax-free employment subsidies which are withdrawn at a rate of 0.19 when indi-
vidual labor incomes exceed a specific threshold. The Employment scenario stipulates a subsidy
of 130 Euro a month, which amounts to about 12.5% of monthly per capita net income, for people
who work at least 10 hours per week. It is withdrawn at a rate of 0.19 starting at individual labor
incomes of 28,250 per year. As a further work incentive for people with low incomes, marginal
transfer withdrawal rates are reduced from virtually 100% to 60% up to monthly incomes of 1,200
Euro (1,500 Euro for people with children). As the scenario comprises subsidization even of jobs
with few weekly working hours and thereby aims to increase employment in general, it is called
Employment in the following.
The Full-Time reform scenario involves a subsidy of the same amount for full-time jobs only
(at least 30 hours per week). It is withdrawn starting at individual labor incomes of 27,150 Euro.
In order to further improve incentives to work full-time, transfers are withdrawn at a rate of 100%,
making part-time employment for transfer recipients less attractive. Under the status quo, transfer
recipients can earn 100 Euro per month without any withdrawal, but from this point onwards,
marginal withdrawal rates are high. The Employment reform scenario stipulates a reduction of
marginal withdrawal rates to 60% up to monthly incomes of 1,200 Euro (1,500 Euro for households
with children). The Full-Time reform scenario imposes marginal withdrawal rates of 100%. The
employment subsidies are financed by abolishing tax and social security exemptions for marginal
employment (“Mini Jobs” and “Midi Jobs”). This is done because these exemptions create strong
disincentives for secondary earners to work more than the marginal employment threshold (450
Euro). This disincentive is illustrated in the next section (Figure 3a). The employment subsidies
of the reform scenarios Employment and Full-Time are alternative ways to subsidize employment
of low wage workers.
In the Flat Tax reform the basic income is set at a similar amount as under the current subsis-
tence level guaranteed through Unemployment Benefit II and Social Assistance. This amounts to
800 Euro per month for adults and 380 Euro for each child below the age of 18 years living in the
household.8 In contrast to the current transfer system, the basic income level does not differen-
8Note that in all scenarios except for Flat Tax, there is an in-work tax credit for families (“Kinderzuschlag”),
granted to parents whose income is sufficient to sustain for themselves but not for the expenses for their children.
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tiate by the number and age of children and the transfer is not means tested. The rate of the flat
tax, which includes social security contributions, necessary to finance this basic income scheme is
about 69%, and the basic income is withdrawn at the same rate. In all three reform scenarios the
pension system remains unchanged, therefore transfers change only for people up to 65 years of
age.
3 Incentives and Budget Constraints
Figure 1a shows the overall marginal tax rate for a single household without children earning an
hourly wage of 20 Euro in the status quo and for each of our reform scenarios, Full-Time, Em-
ployment, and Flat Tax. We abstract from rounding rules in this presentation and use a resolution
of 1 Euro in all two-dimensional graphs. Overall marginal tax rates are defined on the basis of
personal income taxes, social security contributions and transfer payments. We censor marginal
tax rates at -0.2 and 1.2 to increase readability of the graphs. In the status quo, marginal tax rates
are zero at very low monthly household gross labor income levels/working hours because of al-
lowances and deductions regarding transfers. Then, the overall marginal tax rate increases to a
level of 80% which is the transfer withdrawal rate. When labor income subject to transfer with-
drawals exceeds 1,000 Euro, the marginal withdrawal rate is increased to 90%. When it exceeds
1,200 Euro, the MTR is 100%. At about 18 hours, the exemplary household does not receive any
transfers anymore and pays social security and personal income taxes, which together amount to
about 42%.
The Full-Time reform starts with a marginal social security contribution of 20% as the social
security exemption (Mini Jobs) is abolished in this scenario. When labor income exceeds lump sum
allowances for expenses, the overall marginal tax rate, including the transfer withdrawal, increases
to 100%. When transfers are completely withdrawn, in our example at about 12 working hours, the
household pays social security contributions and personal income taxes similar to the status quo.
At 30 hours the household receives the employment subsidy, a discontinuity which is represented
by a spike. Right from the beginning and up to about 35 hours, the subsidy is withdrawn at a
marginal rate of 19%. The overall marginal tax rate under this reform scenario therefore exceeds
the one under the status quo from 0 to 12 and from 30 to 34 hours and attains the same level
as under the status quo for longer working hours. Although social security exemptions for low
wage earners are also abolished in the Employment scenario, due to the smaller marginal transfer
withdrawal rate of 60% and the lower threshold of working hours, for this exemplary household
6
the overall marginal tax rate up to 14 working hours is considerably lower under this scenario than
under the Full-Time reform scenario. Due to the absence of the means test, the overall marginal tax
rate under the Flat Tax reform scenario is below that under the status quo for levels of household
labor income under about 1.500 Euro per month, and exceeds that rate for incomes above that
level. Marginal tax rates under the Flat Tax reform scenario are also markedly lower than under
the Full-Time scenario for relatively low earnings and small working hours, whereas marginal tax
rates under the Employment scenario are high relative to the Flat Tax scenario between 14 and 24
working hours for this exemplary household.
Figure 2a shows the budget constraints for the same exemplary household under the status
quo and the three reform scenarios. Clearly, in the Full-Time scenario the household is worse off
at low incomes. Once transfers are completely withdrawn, net income is identical under Full-
Time and the status quo. At 30 hours, when the employment subsidy is received the household’s
net income exceeds that under the status quo until the subsidy is fully withdrawn at about 35
hours. In contrast, under the Employment scenario, due to the employment subsidy already paid at
10 working hours the household’s net income is initially substantially increased compared to the
status quo, but subsequently increases little with higher earnings when the employment subsidy is
being withdrawn. Due to the higher marginal tax rates on higher incomes required to balance the
budget under this scenario, the exemplary household becomes worse off than under the status quo
at earnings of about 2,500 Euro per month. Under the Flat Tax for labor incomes between about
500 and 2,600 Euro the household’s net income would increase, but would decrease relative to the
status quo for higher earnings levels.
Figure 1b illustrates how the marginal tax rates change for a married couple with two children.
We vary the level of labor income of the primary earner, while holding the labor income of the
secondary earner constant at 20,000 Euro per year. Under the current transfer system, the subsis-
tence level of a couple with two children exceeds that amount, and the exemplary household would
therefore be eligible to Unemployment Benefit II if the primary worker did not work. Marginal tax
rates for couples follow a similar pattern as for single households in the status quo and in all re-
form alternatives. In the Full-Time scenario, the household receives transfers only for a relatively
small income range of the primary earner. Note the striking difference between scenarios in Fig-
ure 2b that shows that for all income levels of the primary earner, the Flat Tax leads to higher net
income than all other reform scenarios and the status quo. This is due to the fact that the basic
income does not depend on household size in the Flat Tax scenario.
In the appendix, Figures 6 and 8 present the overall marginal tax rates, Figures 7 and 9 the
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Figure 1: Marginal Tax Rates by Monthly Household Gross Labor Income and Weekly Working
Hours in Germany, 2011. Source: Own calculations based on a modified version of the STSM.
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budget constraints for households with different characteristics. In particular, we vary the number
of children and the hourly wage. Figure 10 shows both marginal tax rates and budget constraints
the two households presented in Figure 1 and 2 would have if all members earned 10 Euro per
hour each. These figures show that with more children the marginal tax rate is very high, even with
relatively high labor income. This brings about strong disincentives for parents to work.
In the case of couple households it is instructive to consider the entire choice set of these
households. For the status quo and the three alternative reform scenarios, Figure 3 depicts the
overall marginal tax rates of the primary earner for various labor income levels of the primary
and the secondary earner for a couple household with two children where both spouses earn 10
Euro per hour.9 At three vertices of the cube, three numbers are reported. The first number
shows labor income of the secondary earner, the second the overall marginal tax rate, and the
third labor income of the primary earner. Labor income of the primary earner increases from
left to right, and that of the secondary earner increases to the north-east holding primary earner’s
income constant. The vertical axis represents the overall marginal tax rate. All three-dimensional
graphs abstract from rounding rules and are constructed in such a way that the horizontal distance
between two points is 133 Euro monthly labor income. We indicate higher points in red (appearing
as darker shading in monochrome) and lower points with a light teal (lighter shading). Moreover,
we use different markers to distinguish higher points from lower ones in the order circles (lowest),
diamonds, squares, triangles (highest). As with the two-dimensional graphs, we cap marginal tax
rates at -0.2 and 1.2.
Figure 3a shows that, due to joint taxation of couples, the MTR increases with raising income
of the other spouse as soon as monthly labor income of the primary worker exceeds 400 Euro, the
amount exempted from taxation and social security contributions in 2011.10 When monthly la-
bor income exceeds 400 Euro, the entire labor income becomes taxable. Thus, overall MTR are
quite high forming a crest at 400 Euro labor income of the primary earner. This adverse incen-
tive is abolished in all reform scenarios that we analyze. The figure also shows the effect of the
withdrawal of Unemployment Benefit II by step-wise increases of the MTR with increasing labor
income of the secondary worker at low levels of the primary earner’s labor income. Furthermore,
the effect of joint taxation of couples on MTR is clearly visible. The marginal tax rate of the pri-
9Figure 3 and 4 are produced using the user written Stata ado graph3D, see Jessen and Rostam-Afschar (2014).
10Income form marginal employment that exceeds 100 Euro per month is, however, not exempted from transfer
withdrawal.
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mary earner depends on the labor income of the secondary earner which is visible for diagonals
through the cube that correspond to points where the sum of labor income of both earners is the
same. On these diagonals, the MTRs of the primary earner are constant under joint taxation but not
under individual taxation. When comparing Figure 3a to Figure 10b, which represents the same
household, note that the latter denotes monthly household income on the horizontal axis.
Figure 3b presents work incentives of the Full-Time scenario. Compared to the status quo, the
MTR crest vanishes because tax exemptions for marginal employment are abolished under this
alternative. Transfer withdrawal rates are higher and begin at lower income levels (more to the
left). At an income of the primary earner of about 1,200 Euro (30 h), the employment subsidy
causes a negative spike in the marginal tax rate. This lump sum payment is withdrawn at higher
earnings levels of the primary earner, thereby reducing incentives to increase working hours.
The Employment scenario, instead, improves incentives to work in two ways. First, marginal
transfer withdrawal rates for labor incomes below 1,500 Euro are reduced substantially. The effect
of the employment subsidy on the MRT is again depicted as a downward spike at 400 Euro for
the primary earner. Second, transfers are withdrawn at a rate of 100% above this threshold and,
on top of this, the employment subsidy is withdrawn from labor incomes of about 2,200 Euro
on. This leads to higher marginal withdrawal rates compared to the status quo in this region.
After all transfers are withdrawn, the marginal tax rates are similar to those of the status quo
but slightly higher. In contrast to the status quo and the reform scenarios that involve specific
employment subsidies, except for very low levels of primary earner’s labor income the Flat Tax
scenario provides the same incentives for all levels of incomes irrespective of how earnings are
distributed between the two spouses living in the same household.
To show how different combinations of primary and secondary labor incomes affect disposable
income of the household, Figure 4 presents three-dimensional budget graphs for the same house-
hold as above that can be similarly interpreted as the graphs in Figure 3. The only difference is
that the vertical axis represents monthly disposable income. In Figure 4a a bulge observable at
lower household incomes represents transfer payments in the status quo. It is highest at the diago-
nal starting from zero to maximum household income. This is because transfers are paid allowing
for additional earnings. At higher incomes when the household is not eligible for transfers any-
more, the budget constraint becomes almost a plane (due to joint taxation). At low incomes of the
primary and the secondary earner, respectively, trenches caused by the tax exemption for marginal
employment are clearly visible.
Figure 4b shows a flat area at low labor incomes in the Full-Time alternative due to marginal
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withdrawal rates of 100%. As soon as one of the spouses earns more than about 1,200 Euro the
employment subsidy is received. This causes an elevation in the budget surface. The withdrawal of
the employment subsidy makes the surface slightly flatter at higher levels compared to the status
quo. For each level of household labor income, in this reform the allocation of working hours
between partners makes a difference which is not the case in the status quo. The reason is that, in
contrast to household-based taxes, the employment subsidy is granted individually. Points where
both partners work full-time result in higher net income as shown in the figure.
In Figure 4c, the employment subsidy of the Employment reform is visible starting from about
400 Euro of labor incomes as an area bulging incomes upwards. Recall that because from 1,500
Euro labor income on transfers are withdrawn at a rate of 100%, net income is unchanged with
increasing labor income. Net income even decreases for labor incomes over 2,200 Euros when the
household still receives unemployment benefits. This is because the transfer withdrawal rate and
the withdrawal of the subsidy add up to 119%.
Flat Tax leads to a flat budget surface depicted in Figure 4d. As in the status quo, different
labor income combinations that imply a given level of household labor income result in the same
amount of household net income.
To make the analyzed reforms comparable to the literature (Bartels and Pestel 2015; Immervoll
et al. 2007), we show “participation tax rates” (PTR) in Table 2 for interesting discrete decisions
of exemplary households for all reform scenarios. This measure is calculated as
1− (post-government incomehc= j − post-government incomehc=0)
gross labor incomehc= j
,
where j indicates the hours categories (hc) where at least one household member works part-time
(20 h) or full-time (40 h). hc = 0 denotes that no household member works. The higher the
participation tax rates, the more the tax and transfer system reduces the monetary incentives to
work. The exemplary household holds no wealth and does not earn non-labor income and is thus
eligible to Unemployment Benefit II (see Section 2).
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Table 2: Participation Tax Rates in Percent.
Employment Full-Time Flat Tax Status Quo
Couples (Primary Earner Hourly Wage: 20 Euro, Secondary 10 Euro)
full-time (40h), 0 children 59 56 67 58
full-time (40h), 1 child 61 58 67 60
full-time (40h),2 Children 64 61 67 63
part-time (20h), 0 children 55 71 64 71
part-time (20h), 1 child 50 76 64 74
part-time (20h),2 Children 50 82 64 74
full-time (40h) -Zero Hours(0h), 0 children 68 65 67 65
full-time-Zero Hours, 1 child 72 68 67 68
full-time-Zero Hours,2 Children 76 73 67 73
full-time (40h) -part-time (20h), 0 children 61 60 66 60
full-time-part-time, 1 child 64 63 66 63
full-time-part-time,2 Children 67 67 66 67
Singles (Hourly Wage: 20 Euro)
full-time (40h), 0 children 66 62 67 62
full-time, 1 child 69 65 65 65
full-time,2 Children 72 69 65 69
part-time (20h), 0 children 62 76 65 76
part-time, 1 child 55 83 61 78
part-time,2 Children 55 90 61 78
Source: Source: Own calculations based on a modified version of the STSM.
Couples with a primary earner with an hourly wage of 20 Euro and a secondary earner with
an hourly wage of 10 Euro face the strongest incentive to work both full-time in the Full-Time
scenario (PTR of 56 percent for a couple without children). Compared to the status quo (PTR of
58 percent) and Employment (PTR of 59 percent) these incentives are quite similar, while the Flat
Tax offers weaker incentives (PTR of 67 percent) to work full-time. Employment dominates all
other alternatives regarding incentives to work part-time (PTR of 50 percent for a couple with one
child), while Flat Tax offers the second best incentives and Full-Time is similar to the status quo.
The picture is similar for a single with 20 Euro hourly wage. However, the Flat Tax offers the best
incentives to work full-time for singles with children.
Incentives for all employment choices worsen with an increasing number of children for all
scenarios except for the Flat Tax. Also in the Employment scenario, incentives to take up part-time
work do not deteriorate with the number of children. If the household has a child compared to the
same household without children, in the status quo, the PTR increases from 65 to 68 percent e.g.
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if one partner works full-time and the other zero hours. With two children, the PTR increases to
73 percent.
For couples and singles with hourly wages of 10 Euro, the Employment reform offers the lowest
participation tax rates (not reported) for all employment states relative to unemployment, save for
full-time working couples with no children. This is due to the fact that the decrease in transfer
withdrawal rates is especially relevant for low wage households.
4 A Structural Labor Supply Model
We estimate the effect of the three hypothetical reforms on welfare, labor supply and government
revenues using the microsimulation model STSM, see Steiner et al. (2012). In addition to the in-
come tax formula and transfers it accounts for deductions, allowances, social security payments
and child benefits as well as the interactions of the different components of the tax and transfer
system on the household level. The underlying database is the Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), an
annual representative survey of German households with about 20,000 observations per year, see
Wagner et al. (2007). In this study we use the wave 29, which contains retrospective information
for the year 2011. The specification of the structural household labor supply model embedded in
STSM follows van Soest (1995); Aaberge et al. (1995); Aaberge and Colombino (2014). House-
holds are assumed to jointly maximize utility, which depends on hours worked and consumption.
Given their hourly wage, agents make a discrete choice of weekly working hours. The discretiza-
tion of working hours into j alternatives allows for the precise calculation of net incomes asso-
ciated with labor supply decisions using the STSM and—in contrast to continuous labor supply
models—does not impose any restrictions on the form of the budget set, such as convexity. Addi-
tionally, this approach accounts for joint labor supply decisions of couples in a consistent way. We
discretize female weekly working hours into 0, 10, 20, 30, 38 and 45 and male weekly working
hours into 0, 10, 20, 30, 38, and 48, which results in six choice alternatives for single households
and 36 alternatives for couples. Gross labor income is given by the product of working hours and
the hourly wage. Potential hourly wages of the unemployed as well as hourly wages of employed
with item non-response are predicted using a selectivity-corrected wage regression, where selec-
tion is accounted for by the two-step Heckman (1979) approach with binary variables for young
children of four age groups, marital status, non-labor income, and indicators for health as exclu-
sion restriction. Let L f denote leisure of the female partner, Lm leisure of the male partner, C
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consumption, and ε a random disturbance. Then the utility of household i of choice alternative j
is given by
Vi j =U(L fi j,Lmi j,Ci j)+ εi j. (1)
We use the translog specification of the deterministic part of individual utility and allow for
interactions of the components of the utility fuction, i.e.:
Ui j = β1ln(Ci j)+β2ln(Ci j)2 +β3ln(L fi j)+β4ln(L fi j)2 +β5ln(Lmi j)
+β6ln(Lmi j)2 +β7ln(Ci j)ln(L fi j)+β8ln(Ci j)ln(Lmi j)+β9ln(L fi j)ln(Lmi j). (2)
Heterogeneity between households is incorporated through taste shifters—observed household
characteristics that affect some of the coefficients of the utility function:
β1 = αC0 +X
′
1α
C
1 ,
β3 = α
L f
0 +X
′
2α
L f
1 ,
β5 = αLm0 +X
′
3α
Lm
1 .
X1, X2 and X3 contain individual and household characteristics like age, disability indicators,
whether the observed person is German citizen, and number and age of children (see Table 8 for
the exact specification of the utility function)
If the error terms εi j are assumed to be independently and identically distributed across hour
categories and households according to the Extreme-Value type I (EVI) distribution, the probability
that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by a conditional logit model (McFadden 1974):
Pik = Pr(Vik >Vi j,∀ j = 1 . . .J) = exp(Uik)
∑Jj=1 exp(Uik)
,k ∈ J. (3)
Alternative k is chosen if it implies a higher utility than any other alternative. Estimation results
for the labor supply model are reported in Table 8. We distinguish between couples with flexible
labor supply of both spouses, those with inflexible labor supply of one of the spouses, single
men, and single women, where labor supply is assumed to be inflexible for civil servants, self-
employed, pensioners, people on parental leave, soldiers, apprentices, and disabled people who
work in sheltered workshops.
Changes in net income associated with specific hours points leads to changes in the choice
probabilities given by equation 3. These allow for the calculation of aggregate labor supply ef-
fects of the hypothetical reforms. We simulate these effects by the calibration method, i.e., we
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add random error terms from the (EVI) distribution to the estimated utility levels of each choice
alternative in the baseline (status quo) simulation until the utility maximizing choice matches the
observed labor supply at the individual level. This set of choice specific individual errors is then
used in the simulation of labor supply reactions to the reforms (see Creedy and Kalb 2005).11
5 Simulation Results
5.1 Effects on Government Revenue
The three reform scenarios have been calibrated to be close to budget neutral after labor supply
reactions. Table 3 shows the changes in government revenues before and after labor supply reac-
tions. In the absence of any labor supply responses the Employment and especially the Flat Tax
reforms would result in a substantial increase in government revenues, whereas they would be re-
duced by about 462 million Euro per year in case of the Full-Time reform. Accounting for labor
supply responses renders all three reform scenarios virtually budgetary neutral due to the decrease
in employment elicited by the Employment and Flat Tax reforms and a small overall increase in
total working hours in case of Full-Time reform, as described below.
Table 3: Changes in Government Revenue in Million Euro
Labor Supply Responses Employment Full Time Flat Tax
Before 3,302 −462 26,187
After 25 16 164
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v29l (2012) and a
modified version of the STSM.
11We only simulate labor supply responses for households with flexible labor supply and positive first derivatives.
The fraction of households with positive derivatives is reported at the bottom of Table 8.
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5.2 Labor Supply Effects
Table 4 shows the estimated percentage changes in working hours. The last line of the table shows
that both the Employment and Flat Tax scenarios would reduce total labor supply, while the total
effect of the Full-Time reform would be negligible. The Employment reform would reduce supplied
hours by 1%, the increase induced by the Full-Time reform would be virtually zero, while the Flat
Tax reform would reduce supplied hours substantially by 4.9%. For the Employment and Flat Tax
reforms, female labor supply reacts more strongly than male labor supply, which is a typical result
in labor economics.
All three reforms are designed to improve work incentives for low income households and
indeed all three reforms would increase labor supply in the decile with the lowest net equivalence
income under the status quo. While the Employment and Full-Time reforms would increase labor
supply in the first decile by 0.3% and 0.9% respectively, the Flat Tax reform would lead to the
strongest increase of 1.4% in this decile. For all reforms, the positive changes in labor supply would
be almost entirely due to men increasing their labor supply in the first decile. For all other deciles,
the labor supply effects of the Employment and Flat Tax reforms are negative due to increased
marginal tax rates and in case of the Flat Tax the increased transfer income for larger households.
The Full-Time reform, which leaves marginal tax rates unchanged has modest effects in the upper
nine deciles ranging from -0.4% to 0.2%. The lower part of Table 4 shows labor supply reactions
by household types—divided into singles and couples with zero, one or more than two children.
Overall, the Employment and Flat Tax reforms lead to negative total labor supply changes for all
of these household types. The Full-Time reform reduces labor supply for some types of single
households and increases labor supply for all types of couple households.
Table 5 shows simulated effects of the reform scenarios on the participation rate by income
deciles and households types in percentage points. The effects are in line with the responses
for working hours: The Flat Tax has a relatively strong negative effect (-3.3 percentage points),
while the negative effects of the Employment reform (-0.3 percentage points) and of the Full-Time
reform (-0.2 percentage points) are negligible. The Employment reform succeeds in increasing the
participation rate for the two lowest income deciles only, while the effect is positive only in the
lowest decile for the Flat Tax and zero or negative in all other deciles. For the Full-Time reform,
both positive and negative effects can be found over the income distribution.
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Table 4: Simulated Labor Supply Effects of the Reform Scenarios by Household Types, Over
the Income Distribution, and on Aggregate.
Employment Full-Time Flat Tax
Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Changes in Hours Worked (in Percent)
Deciles of Net Equivalence Income
1st -0.0 0.8 0.3 -0.7 3.8 0.9 -0.1 4.1 1.4
2nd -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 -2.5 -0.1 -1.5
3rd -1.1 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 0.1 -0.4 -7.2 -0.7 -4.1
4th -3.2 -0.1 -1.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 -3.2 -0.9 -2.0
5th -1.7 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 -0.0 -7.2 -2.3 -4.7
6th -4.8 -0.2 -2.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -9.2 -4.0 -6.5
7th -2.3 -0.9 -1.6 0.5 -0.1 0.2 -10.0 -1.6 -5.6
8th -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 -13.4 -3.0 -8.1
9th -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -9.1 -2.6 -5.4
10th -1.7 -0.2 -0.8 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -12.0 -5.1 -8.0
By Household Type
Couples, 0 Children -1.2 -0.4 -0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -7.2 -1.4 -4.0
Couples, 1 Child -1.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 0.3 0.1 -6.7 -1.5 -3.8
Couples,2+ Children -1.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -6.6 -1.6 -3.8
Singles, 0 Children -2.2 0.0 -1.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -9.2 -4.6 -7.1
Singles, 1 Child -4.1 0.0 -3.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 -8.2 -14.3 -8.8
Singles, 2+ Children -3.0 0.0 -2.6 -0.9 0.0 -0.7 -4.4 -0.7 -3.8
All Households -1.7 -0.3 -1.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -7.7 -2.2 -4.9
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v29l (2012) and a modified version of the STSM.
For men, the participation effects of the Full-Time reform are non-negative for all deciles and all
household types. This can be explained by the fact that men rarely work part-time and are therefore
less affected by the abolishment of exemptions for marginal employment and increased transfer
withdrawal rates while profiting from the subsidization of full-time employment. In contrast, the
effect of the Full-Time reform on participation rates for women is either negative or zero in all
income deciles.
Split into household types, the participation effects have the same sign as the hours changes for
the Employment and Flat Tax reforms: they are non-positive for all household types and zero for
single men for the Employment reform. For the Full-Time reform, participation effects are negative
for all household types, while hours effects are positive for most household types. This shows that
the incentives provided by this reform, lead households to change from part-time employment to
full-time employment or unemployment.
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Table 5: Simulated Participation Effects of the Reform Scenarios by Household Types, Over
the Income Distribution, and on Aggregate.
Employment Full-Time Flat Tax
Women Men Total Women Men Total Women Men Total
Changes in Participation Rates (in Percentage Points)
Deciles of Net Equivalence Income
1st 0.0 1.0 0.4 -1.7 2.6 0.0 -0.7 2.1 0.4
2nd 0.3 0.0 0.2 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -1.8 0.0 -1.1
3rd -0.5 0.0 -0.3 -1.4 0.0 -0.8 -3.0 -0.4 -2.0
4th 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.9 0.0 -0.5 -2.3 -1.5 -2.0
5th -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -3.8 -2.6 -3.2
6th -0.8 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.2 -3.3 -3.8
7th -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -6.3 -1.8 -4.1
8t -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.3 -2.5 -5.5
9th -0.5 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -6.0 -2.4 -4.2
10th -0.9 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.2 -2.6 -4.9
By Household Type
Couples, 0 Children -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 -0.1 -4.5 -1.2 -2.8
Couples, 1 Child -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 -4.6 -1.0 -2.8
Couples,2+ Children -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 -4.5 -1.0 -2.8
Singles, 0 Children 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -6.2 -5.6 -5.9
Singles, 1 Child -0.9 0.0 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -3.2 -8.0 -3.7
Singles, 2 Children -0.8 0.0 -0.8 -1.7 0.0 -1.5 -1.7 -8.3 -2.3
All Households -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.2 -4.5 -1.8 -3.3
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v29l (2012) and a modified version of the STSM.
5.3 Income Effects and Welfare
Table 6 shows annual changes in average incomes and compensating variations, i.e. the amount of
money that would have to be given or taken away from a household after a reform for it to reach
the utility level it had before the reform. We adjust these measures by the OECD equivalence
scale for different household types. Positive compensating variations indicate welfare gains. The
compensating variations are generally larger than the income changes when households reduce
their labor supply.
All three reforms lead to income and welfare gains for lone parents. The Full-Time reform
leads to both income and welfare gains for all household types. The Employment reform leads
to welfare gains for all household types except for childless singles, while only lone parents gain
financially. The Flat Tax induces the most radical effects: because transfers are no longer adjusted
for household size, people with children gain substantially, the compensating variation of singles
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with at least two children is more than 2,200 Euro. On the other hand, singles without children
have a negative compensating variation of more than 400 Euro because of the increase in tax rates.
The income loss for this group is close to 2,000 Euro, but it is partially offset in welfare terms by
a substantial reduction in labor supply.
Table 6: Simulated Income and Welfare Changes of the Reform Sce-
narios Adjusted by the OECD Equivalence Scale by Household Types
and on Aggregate in Euro per Year and Household.
Employment Full-Time Flat Tax
Income CV Income CV Income CV
Change Change Change
Couples, 0 Children -172 84 451 501 88 972
Couples, 1 Child -93 139 447 492 255 1066
Couples,2+ Children -102 140 434 491 241 1055
Singles, 0 Children -379 -128 485 483 -1987 -469
Singles, 1 Child 5 640 282 282 325 1832
Singles, 2+ Children 433 579 85 69 1682 2249
All Households -182 81 444 473 -423 662
Notes: Our sample comprises households with members who have flexi-
ble labor supply.
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v29l (2012) and a modified
version of the STSM.
Table 7 depicts income and welfare changes adjusted by the OECD equivalence scale over the
income distribution. The Employment reform clearly benefits those with low incomes at the cost
of those with higher incomes. Compensating variations for the lowest decile are more than 1,900
Euro on average and 1,600 Euro for the 2nd decile, the average compensating variations decrease
steadily with increasing income. While households in the 5th decile still gain on average, those
in the 6th decile lose and the compensating variation for the 10th decile is about -1,500 Euro on
average.
In the Full-Time reform all deciles of the income distribution gain both in terms of income and
welfare, the highest gains are reached by the 3rd to 5th income decile, while the upper deciles gain
less from the employment subsidy.
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Table 7: Simulated Income and Welfare Changes of the Reform
Scenarios Adjusted by the OECD Equivalence Scale over the In-
come Distribution and on Aggregate.
Employment Full-Time Flat Tax
Income CV Income CV Income CV
Change Change Change
Deciles of Net Equivalence Income
1st 1943 1920 229 98 4296 4210
2nd 1558 1600 515 511 4065 4078
3rd 941 992 741 747 2941 3330
4th 389 613 750 805 2178 2561
5th -73 134 613 696 1067 1830
6th -852 -294 459 543 -48 1165
7th -928 -498 424 463 -948 48
8th -1137 -885 348 375 -2822 -998
9th -1418 -1215 242 264 -4531 -2827
10th -2209 -1515 117 228 -10387 -6715
All Households -182 81 444 473 -423 662
Notes: Our sample comprises households with members who have
flexible labor supply.
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v29l (2012) and a mod-
ified version of the STSM.
The Flat Tax reform leads to income and welfare gains for the lower five deciles. On aver-
age, incomes in the 6th and 7th decile decrease but in welfare terms this is more than offset by
the increase in leisure. For the upper three deciles both the income changes and the compensating
variations are negative on average. The largest welfare gains are registered for the 1st decile (com-
pensating variation of more than 4,200 Euro), while the highest average welfare loss is estimated
with about 6,700 Euro for the 10th decile.
The average welfare measures in the bottom line of Table 7 imply that each person is given the
same weight. Alternatively, aggregate welfare changes may also be evaluated by a social welfare
function with individual weights depending on some function of individual income. Figure 5
and Table 9 in the appendix show aggregate welfare gains for different values of a parameter for
redistributive taste v. The weighted average compensating variation (wcv) is given by
wcv =
∑Ni=1 cvi/yvi
∑Ni=1 1/yvi
, (4)
where y denotes income and cv denotes the compensating variation, both adjusted by the OECD
equivalence scale. The higher is v, the higher is the welfare weight assigned to individuals with
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Figure 5: Average Weighted Compensated Variations of Reforms. Source: Own calculations based
on the SOEP v29l (2012) and a modified version of the STSM.
lower incomes. v = 0 leads to the utilitarian social welfare function, which assigns the same
weight to all members of society. If v= 1, wcv is a weighted mean with weights y−1i . If v→∞, wcv
converges to the Rawlsian social welfare function.
All three reforms lead to average welfare gains for all values of v. Using a utilitarian social
welfare function, the aggregate welfare gains of the Employment reform are relatively small and
the Full-Time and Flat Tax reform lead to average welfare gains of about 500 and 700 Euro,
respectively. The welfare gains of the Flat Tax reform are monotonically increasing with v as
it leads to the highest welfare gains for low income households and welfare losses for higher
income households. Aggregate welfare gains of the Full-Time reform decrease smoothly, because
the employment subsidy starts at rather high levels of income and the transfer withdrawal rates
are increased. Welfare gains of the Employment reform increase with v. The Full-Time reform
dominates the Employment reform in welfare terms for v< 1, the reverse is true for higher values
of v. The Flat Tax reform dominates both Full-Time and Employment at all levels of v.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed three budgetary neutral reforms of the German tax and transfer
system—two reforms that employ employment subsidies to improve work incentives for people
with low incomes and a Flat Tax reform with a basic income equal to the current level of Un-
employment Benefit II. The first two reforms stipulate employment subsidies of 1,560 Euro per
year for people working at least 10 (Employment) or 30 (Full-Time) hours a week, respectively. In
addition, the 10 hours reform involves a reduction of marginal transfer withdrawal rates. It is fi-
nanced by abolishing social security exemptions for marginal employment and increasing marginal
tax rates. The Full-Time reform is financed by abolishing social security exemptions for marginal
employment and increasing marginal transfer withdrawal rates.
Using a structural labor supply model, we have estimated labor supply reactions and welfare
effects of the reform scenarios. We find that all three reforms increase labor supply in the first
decile of the income distribution. However, the Flat Tax reform and the reform designed to increase
incentives for labor market participation (Employment) reduce labor supply of households at most
other income deciles, while the Full-Time reform has a negligible effect on overall labor supply.
The Flat Tax scenario reduces overall labor supply by about 4.9%, while the Employment reform
scenario has only a relatively small negative effect on labor supply. With equal welfare weights,
aggregate welfare gains are realizable under all three reforms. The stronger the redistributive taste,
the higher are the welfare gains of the flat tax reform.
A word of caution about the limitations of the model employed for our analysis is in order
as the application of a dynamic labor supply model could result in lower potential welfare gains.
First, empirical studies of labor supply tend to find small labor supply elasticities (see Meghir and
Phillips 2010) and this includes structural models limited to one period. However, this common
finding is challenged by models that account for learning on the job and often find substantially
larger elasticities (see Keane and Rogerson 2012). In the presence of larger labor supply elasticities
than the ones estimated by the model applied in this study, the basic income of the Flat Tax reform
as well as the employment subsidy of the Employment reform would have to be financed by even
larger tax increases, which in turn would reduce the welfare gains of these reforms. However,
Blundell et al. (2013) estimate a dynamic model for women that accounts for learning on the job
and find elasticities similar to the ones obtained with a static one-period model.
Moreover, the static model does not account for uncertainty. The welfare gains of the Flat Tax
are smaller when households are forward looking decision makers and future income is uncertain.
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Rostam-Afschar and Yao (2014) show that the social insurance provided by the progressivity of
the German tax and transfer system generates additional welfare. The median household would
have to be compensated by about 65,000 Euro or 12% of lifetime income to choose the revenue
neutral flat tax instead of the progressive tax.
Keeping these caveats in mind, we conclude that it is difficult to reform the German tax and
transfer system in a way that improves work incentives for low income households without de-
creasing overall labor supply and violating budgetary neutrality. However, aggregate welfare im-
provements are possible through more redistribution to low income households and households
with children. A flat-tax with unconditional basic income may achieve these aims for Germany.
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Figure 6: Marginal Tax Rates by Monthly Household Gross Labor Income and Weekly Working Hours in Germany, 2011. Source: Own
calculations based on a modified version of the STSM.
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Figure 7: Budget Constraint by Monthly Household Gross Labor Income and Weekly Working Hours in Germany, 2011. Source: Own
calculations based on a modified version of the STSM.
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Figure 8: Marginal Tax Rates by Monthly Household Gross Labor Income and Weekly Working Hours in Germany, 2011. Source: Own
calculations based on a modified version of the STSM.
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Figure 9: Budget Constraint by Monthly Household Gross Labor Income and Weekly Working Hours in Germany, 2011. Source: Own
calculations based on a modified version of the STSM.
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Figure 10: Marginal Tax Rates and Budget Constraint by Monthly Household Gross Labor Income and Weekly Working Hours in Germany,
2011. Source: Own calculations based on a modified version of the STSM.
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Table 8: Estimation Results for Labor Supply Model, Dependent Variable: Hours Chosen.
Variables Flexible Women with Men with Single Single
Couples Inflexible Inflexible Men Women
Spouse Spouse
Log Net Income 4.018 -5.930∗ 2.983 -1.705 -3.338
(2.858) (2.318) (9.246) (2.596) (2.319)
(Log Net Income)2 0.193∗ 0.198∗ -0.0526 0.0785 0.237∗∗∗
(0.0777) (0.0884) (0.351) (0.0667) (0.0659)
Log Net Income × East 3.261 -11.83 -2.336 5.420∗∗ 1.027
(2.507) (6.587) (8.167) (1.952) (1.877)
Log Net Income)2 × East -0.232 0.587 0.0650 -0.337∗∗ -0.0691
(0.132) (0.339) (0.413) (0.117) (0.116)
Log Net Income × German Female 0.428 2.614∗ -0.124 0.380
(0.312) (1.050) (0.387) (0.412)
Log Leisure Female 62.91∗∗∗ 56.56∗∗∗ 55.44∗∗∗
(6.400) (6.962) (7.998)
Log Net Income -0.370 -0.00946 -0.0151
× Log Leisure Female (0.262) (0.236) (0.370)
Log Leisure Female 2 -6.585∗∗∗ -6.257∗∗∗ -6.529∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.730) (0.704)
Log Leisure Female × German Female -0.6885 -0.0200 -1.109
(0.384) (0.737) (0.608)
Age Female x Log Leisure Female -0.218∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗ -0.144
(0.0720) (0.0884) (0.0853)
Age 2 × Log Leisure Female 0.00374∗∗∗ 0.00633∗∗∗ 0.00259∗∗
(0.000837) (0.000992) (0.000986)
Log Leisure Female × Disability I 0.192 0.944∗ 1.053∗∗
(0.348) (0.435) (0.403)
Log Leisure Female × Disability II 0.729 1.868∗ 1.546∗
(0.666) (0.816) (0.617)
Log Leisure Female × East -15.48∗∗∗ -1.480∗∗ -0.515
(2.506) (0.468) (0.456)
Log Leisure Female 4.649∗∗∗ 3.958∗∗∗ 4.393∗∗∗
× Children Under 3 Years (0.292) (0.420) (0.6885)
Log Leisure Female 1.888∗∗∗ 1.811∗∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗
× Children 7 to 16 Years (0.192) (0.289) (0.314)
Log Leisure Female 2.007∗∗∗ 1.977∗∗∗ 2.148∗∗∗
× Children 4 to 6 Years (0.266) (0.420) (0.487)
Log Leisure Female 1.009∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗ -0.561
× Children over 17 Years (0.189) (0.267) (0.323)
Female Part Time I -1.087∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗∗ -2.185∗∗∗
(0.0722) (0.106) (0.146)
Female Part Time II -0.890∗∗∗ -1.079∗∗∗ -1.515∗∗∗
(0.0725) (0.101) (0.0977)
Table continued on next page.
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Variables Flexible Women with Men with Single Single
Couples Inflexible Inflexible Men Women
Spouse Spouse
Log Net Income × German Male 0.656 -0.139 -0.593 0.0380
(0.461) (0.250) (1.695) (0.544)
Log Leisure Male × Log Net Income -1.447∗∗∗ -0.0206 0.201
(0.292) (0.590) (0.412)
Log Leisure Male 92.14∗∗∗ 54.52∗∗∗ 38.03∗∗∗
(5.680) (9.276) (7.901)
(Log Leisure Male)2 -8.540∗∗∗ -6.196∗∗∗ -5.125∗∗∗
(0.323) (0.573) (0.585)
Log Leisure × German Male -0.817 -0.902 0.365
(0.495) (1.142) (0.973)
Log Leisure Male × Age Male -0.320∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗ 0.00263
(0.0705) (0.109) (0.0784)
Log Leisure Male × Age Male2 0.00392∗∗∗ 0.00368∗∗ 0.000140
(0.000782) (0.00123) (0.000922)
Log Leisure Male × Disability I 0.994∗∗∗ 1.255∗ 1.570∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.494) (0.422)
Log Leisure Male × Disability II 1.815∗∗∗ 2.171∗ 1.819∗∗
(0.549) (0.909) (0.599)
Log Leisure Male × East -13.80∗∗∗ -0.0987 -0.161
(2.656) (0.686) (0.555)
Male Part Time I -3.497∗∗∗ -3.116∗∗∗ -3.671∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.389) (0.341)
Male Part Time II -3.484∗∗∗ -3.299∗∗∗ -3.398∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.204) (0.177)
Log Leisure Male × Log Leisure Female -0.0293
× German Male (0.115)
Log Leisure Male × Log Leisure Female -0.785
(0.422)
Log Leisure Male × Log Leisure Female 3.365∗∗∗
quad × East (0.658)
Observations 105,002 8,983 4,284 5,017 7,768
Derivatives
Uy > 0 97% 91% 100% 76% 100%
Ul f > 0 67% 58% 73%
Ulm > 0 100% 100% 78%
Source: Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP v29l (2012) and a modified version of the STSM.
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Table 9: Average Welfare Changes under Dif-
ferent Welfare Weights.
Employment Full-Time Flat Tax
v= 0 84 492 688
v= 0.5 290 497 1313
v= 1 484 495 1856
v= 1.5 666 487 2359
v= 2 833 476 2865
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP
v29l (2012) and a modified version of the
STSM.
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